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Deterministic Team Problems with
Signaling Incentive
Ather Gattami
Abstract
This paper considers linear quadratic team decision problems where the players in
the team affect each other’s information structure through their decisions. Whereas the
stochastic version of the problem is well known to be complex with nonlinear optimal
solutions that are hard to find, the deterministic counterpart is shown to be tractable.
We show that under a mild assumption, where the weighting matrix on the controller is
chosen large enough, linear decisions are optimal and can be found efficiently by solving a
semi-definite program.
Index Terms
Team Decision Theory, Game Theory, Convex Optimization.
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2NOTATION
S
n The set of n× n symmetric matrices.
S
n
+ The set of n× n symmetric positive
semidefinite matrices.
S
n
++ The set of n× n symmetric positive
definite matrices.
C The set of functions µ : Rp → Rm with
µ(y) = (µ1(y1), µ2(y2), ..., µN(yN)),
µi : R
pi → Rmi ,
∑
imi = m,
∑
i pi = p.
K {K ∈ Rm×p|K = ⊕
∑
Ki, Ki ∈ Rmi×pi}
A† Denotes the pseudo-inverse of the
square matrix A.
A⊥ Denotes the matrix with minimal number
of columns spanning the nullspace of A.
Ai The ith block row of the matrix A.
Aij The block element of A in position(i, j).
 A  B ⇐⇒ A− B ∈ Sn+.
≻ A ≻ B ⇐⇒ A− B ∈ Sn++.
Tr Tr[A] is the trace of the matrix A.
N (m,X) The set of Gaussian variables with
mean m and covariance X.
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3I. INTRODUCTION
The team problem is an optimization problem, where a number of decision makers
(or players) make up a team, optimizing a common cost function with respect to some
uncertainty representing nature. Each member of the team has limited information
about the global state of nature. Furthermore, the teammembers could have different
pieces of information, which makes the problem different from the one considered in
classical optimization, where there is only one decision function that has access to
the entire information available about the state of nature.
Team problems seemed to possess certain properties that were considerably dif-
ferent from standard optimization, even for specific problem structures such as the
optimization of a quadratic cost in the state of nature and the decisions of the
team members. In stochastic linear quadratic decision theory, it was believed for a
while that certainty-equvalence holds between estimation and optimal decision with
complete information, even for team problems. The certainty-equivalence principle
can be briefly explained as follows. First assume that every team member has access
to the information about the entire state of nature, and find the corresponding
optimal decision for each member. Then, each member makes an estimate of the
state of nature, which is in turn combined with the optimal decision obtained from
the full information assumption. It turns out that this strategy does not yield an
optimal solution (see [9]).
A general solution to static stochastic quadratic team problems was presented by
Radner [9]. Radner’s result gave hope that some related problems of dynamic nature
could be solved using similar arguments. But in 1968, Witsenhausen [11] showed in
his well known paper that finding the optimal decision can be complex if the decision
makers affect each other’s information. Witsenhausen considered a dynamic decision
problem over two time steps to illustrate that difficulty. The dynamic problem can
actually be written as a static team problem:
minimize E
{
k0u
2
0 + (x+ u0 − u1)
2
}
subject to u0 = µ0(x), u1 = µ1(x+ u0 + w),
where x and w are Gaussian with zero mean and variance X and W , respectively.
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Fig. 1. Coding-decoding diagram over a Gaussian channel.
Here, we have two decision makers, one corresponding to u0, and the other to u1.
Witsenhausen showed that the optimal decisions µ0 and µ1 are not linear because of
the signaling/coding incentive of u0. Decision maker u1 measures x+u0+w, and hence,
its measurement is affected by u0. Decision maker u0 tries to encode information
about x in its decision, which makes the optimal strategy complex.
The problem above is actually an information theoretic problem. To see this, con-
sider the slightly modified problem
minimize E (x− u1)
2
subject to u0 = µ0(x), E u
2
0 ≤ 1, u1 = µ1(u0 + w)
The modification made is that we removed u0 from the objective function, and in-
stead added a constraint E u20 ≤ 1 to make sure that it has a limited variance (of
course we could set an arbitrary power limitation on the variance). The modified
problem is exactly the Gaussian channel coding/decoding problem (see Figure 1)!
The optimal solution to Witsenhausens counterexample is still unknown. Even if we
would restrict the optimization problem to the set of linear decisions, there is still
no known polynomial-time algorithm to find optimal solutions. Another interesting
counterexample was recently given in [7].
In this paper, we consider the problem of distributed decision making with infor-
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5mation constraints under linear quadratic settings. For instance, information con-
straints appear naturally when making decisions over networks. These problems
can be formulated as team problems. Early results considered static team theory
in stochastic settings [8], [9], [5]. In [2], the team problem with two team members
was solved. The solution cannot be easily extended to more than two players since
it uses the fact that the two members have common information; a property that
doesn’t necessarily hold for more than two players. [2] uses the result to consider the
two-player problem with one-step delayed measurement sharing with the neighbors,
which is a special case of the partially nested information structure, where there
is no signaling incentive. Also, a nonlinear team problem with two team members
was considered in [1], where one of the team members is assumed to have full
information whereas the other member has only access to partial information about
the state of the world. Related team problems with exponential cost criterion were
considered in [6]. Optimizing team problems with respect to affine decisions in a
minimax quadratic cost was shown to be equivalent to stochastic team problems
with exponential cost, see [3]. The connection is not clear when the optimization is
carried out over nonlinear decision functions. In [4], a general solution was given
for an arbitrary number of team members, where linear decision were shown to be
optimal and can be found by solving a linear matrix inequality. In the deterministic
version of Witsenhausen’s counterexample, that is minimizing the quadratic cost
with respect to the worst case scenario of the state x (instead of the assumption that
x is Gaussian), the linear decisions where shown to be optimal in [10].
We will show that for static linear quadratic minimax team problems, where the
players in the team affect each others information structure through their decisions,
linear decisions are optimal in general, and can be found by solving a linear matrix
inequality.
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6II. MAIN RESULTS
The deterministic problem considered is a quadratic game between a team of
players and nature. Each player has limited information that could be different from
the other players in the team. This game is formulated as a minimax problem, where
the team is the minimizer and nature is the maximizer. We show that if there is a
solution to the static minimax team problem, then linear decisions are optimal, and
we show how to find a linear optimal solution by solving a linear matrix inequality.
III. DETERMINISTIC TEAM PROBLEMS WITH SIGNALING INCENTIVE
Consider the following team decision problem
inf
µ
sup
v∈Rp,06=w∈Rq
L(w, u)
‖w‖2 + ‖v‖2
subject to yi =
N∑
j=1
Dijuj + Eiw + vi
ui = µi(yi)
for i = 1, ..., N,
(1)
where ui ∈ Rmi and Ei ∈ Rpi×q, for i = 1, ..., N ,
L(w, u) is a quadratic cost given by
L(w, u) =

w
u


T 
Qww Qwu
Quw Quu



w
u

 ,
Quu ∈ Sm++, m = m1 + · · ·+mN , and
Qww Qwu
Quw Quu

 ∈ Sm+n+ .
The players u1,..., uN make up a team, which plays against nature represented
by the vector w, using µ ∈ C. This problem is more complicated than the static
team decision problem studied in [4], since it has the same flavour as that of the
Witsenhausen counterexample that was presented in the introduction. We see that
the measurement yi of decision maker i could be affected by the other decision makers
through the terms Dijuj, j = 1, ..., N .
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7Note that we have the equality y = Du + Ew + v which is equivalent to v =
Du+Ew− y. Using this substitution of variable, the team problem (1) is equivalent
to
inf
µ∈C
sup
y∈Rp,06=w∈Rq
L(w, µ(y))
||Dµ(y) + Ew − y||2 + ‖w‖2
(2)
Assumption 1:
γ⋆ ≤ γ¯ := inf
Du 6=0
uTQuuu
uTDTDu
.
Theorem 1: Let γ⋆ be the value of the game (1) and suppose that Assumption 1
holds. Then the following statements hold:
(i) There exist linear decisions µi(yi) = Kiyi, i = 1, ..., N , where the value γ
⋆ is
achieved.
(ii) If γ⋆ < γ¯, then for any γ ∈ [γ⋆ , γ¯), a linear decision Ky with K ∈ K that achieves
γ is obtained by solving the linear matrix inequality
find K
subject to K = diag(K1, ...,KN )
C =
[
I 0
]
∈ Rp×(p+q), Quu(γ) ∈ S
m×m

Qxx(γ) Qxu(γ)
Qux(γ) Quu(γ)

 =


Qww 0 Qwu
0 0 0
Quw 0 Quu

− γ


ETE −ET −ETD
−E I −D
−DTE −DT DTD



Qxx(γ) +Qxu(γ)KC + C
TKTQux(γ) C
TKT
KC −Q−1uu (γ)

  0,
Proof:
(i) Note that
y = Du+ Ew + v ⇐⇒ v = y −Du− Ew ⇒
⇒
L(w, u)
||v||2 + ‖w‖2
=
L(w, u)
||y −Du− Ew||2 + ‖w‖2
.
Now introduce x ∈ Rn, n = p+ q, such that
x =

w
y

 ,
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8and
Q =


Qww 0 Qwu
0 0 0
Quw 0 Quu

 ,
R =


ETE −ET −ETD
−E I −D
−DTE −DT DTD

 .
(3)
Then,
J(x, u) :=

x
u


T
Q

x
u

 = L(w, u),
F (x, u) :=

x
u


T
R

x
u

 = ||y −Du−Ew||2 + ‖w‖2,
and y = Cx. Hence, we have that
L(w, u)
||v||2 + ‖w‖2
=
L(w, u)
||y −Du−Ew||2 + ‖w‖2
=
J(x, u)
F (x, u)
.
Then, for any γ ∈ (γ⋆ , γ¯), there exists a decision function µ ∈ C such that
J(x, µ(Cx))− γF (x, µ(Cx)) =

 x
µ(Cx)


T 
Qxx(γ) Qxu(γ)
Qux(γ) Quu(γ)



 x
µ(Cx)

 ≤ 0
for all x. Under Assumption 1, we have that
Quu(γ) = Quu − γD
TD ≻ 0
for any γ ∈ (γ⋆ , γ¯]. Thus, we can apply Theorem 1 in [4], which implies that there
must exist linear decisions that can achieve any γ ∈ (γ⋆ , γ¯]. By compactness, there
must exist linear decisions that achieve γ⋆.
(ii) Let µ(Cx) = KCx for K ∈ K. Then

 x
KCx


T 
Qxx(γ) Qxu(γ)
Qux(γ) Quu(γ)



 x
KCx

 ≤ 0, ∀x
m
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9
 I
KC


T 
Qxx(γ) Qxu(γ)
Qux(γ) Quu(γ)



 I
KC

  0
m
Qxx(γ) +Qxu(γ)KC + C
TKTQux(γ) + C
TKTQuu(γ)KC  0
m

Qxx(γ) +Qxu(γ)KC + C
TKTQux(γ) C
TKT
KC −Q−1uu (γ)

  0,
and the proof is complete.
IV. LINEAR QUADRATIC CONTROL WITH ARBITRARY INFORMATION CONSTRAINTS
Consider the dynamic team decision problem
inf
µ
sup
w,v 6=0
∑M
k=1

x(k)
u(k)


T 
Qxx Qxu
Qux Quu



x(k)
u(k)


∑M
k=1 ‖w(k)‖
2 + ‖v(k)‖2
subject to x(k + 1) = Ax(k) +Bu(k) + w(k)
yi(k) = Cix(k) + vi(k)
ui(k) = [µk]i(yi(k)), i = 1, ..., N.
(4)
Now write x(t) and y(t) as
x(t) =
t∑
k=1
AkBu(M − k) +
t∑
k=1
Akw(M − k),
yi(t) =
t∑
k=1
CiA
kBu(M − k) +
t∑
k=1
CiA
kw(M − k) + vi(k).
It is easy to see that the optimal control problem above is equivalent to a static team
problem of the form (1). Thus, linear controllers are optimal under Assumption 1.
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Example 1: Consider the deterministic version of the Witsenhausen counterexam-
ple presented in the introduction:
inf
µ1,µ2
γ
s. t.
k2µ21(y1) + (x1 − µ2(y2))
2
x20 + w
2
≤ γ
y1 = x0
x1 = x0 + µ1(y1)
y2 = x1 + w = x0 + µ1(y1) + w
Substitue x0 = y1, x1 = y1 + µ1(y1) and w
2 = (x0 + µ1(y1)− y2)2 in the inequality
k2µ21(y1) + (x1 − µ2(y2))
2 ≤ γ(x20 + w
2).
Then, we get the equivalent problem
inf
µ1,µ2
γ
s. t. k2µ21(y1) + (y1 + µ1(y1)− µ2(y2))
2 ≤ γ(y21 + (y1 + µ1(y1)− y2)
2)
Completing the squares gives the following equivalent inequality


y1
y2
µ1(y1)
µ2(y2)


T 

1− 2γ γ 1− γ −1
γ −γ γ 0
1− γ γ 1 + k2 − γ −1
−1 0 −1 1




y1
y2
µ1(y1)
µ2(y2)


≤ 0
For k2 = 0.1, we can search over γ < γ¯ = k2 = 0.1, and we can use Theorem 1 to
deduce that linear decisions are optimal, and can be computed by iteratively solving
a linear matrix inequality, where the iterations are done with respect to γ. We find
that
γ⋆ ≈ 0.0901,
µ1(y1) = −0.9001y1,
µ2(y2) = −0.0896y2.
July 20, 2017 DRAFT
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For k2 = 1, we iterate with respect to γ < 1, and we find optimal linear decisions
given by
µ1(y1)=−0.3856y1
µ2(y2)=0.3840y2
⇓
γ⋆ = 0.3820
Example 2: Consider the deterministic counterpart of the multi-stage finite-horizon
stochastic control problem that was considered in [7]:
inf
µk :R→R
sup
x0,v0,...,vm−1∈R
(xm − x0)2 +
∑m−2
k=0 µ
2
k(yk)
x20 + v
2
0 + · · ·+ v
2
m−1
subject to the dynamics
xk+1 = µk(yk)
yk = xk + vk.
It is easy to check that γ¯ = 1 and Quu−γDTD ≻ 0 for γ < γ¯ (compare with Assumption
1) . Thus, linear decisions are optimal. This is compared to the stochastic version,
where linear decisions where not optimal for m > 2.
V. CONCLUSIONS
We have considered the static team problem in deterministic linear quadratic
settings where the team members may affect each others information. We have
shown that decisions that are linear in the observations are optimal and can be
found by solving a linear matrix inequality.
For future work, it would be interesting to consider the case where the measure-
ments are given by y = Du+ Ew + Fv, for an arbitrary matrix F .
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